The 9-11 Commission Report – NOTES

NOTES For simplicity, we have adopted the following citation conventions in these endnotes. Dozens of government agencies and other entities provided the Commission with more than 2.5 million pages of documents and other materials, including more than 1,000 hours of audiotapes. In general, we cite documents and other materials by providing the agency or entity … Continue reading →

APPENDIX A – COMMON ABBREVIATIONS

APPENDIX A COMMON ABBREVIATIONS   CAP combat air patrol CAPPS Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System CENTCOM Central Command CIA Central Intelligence Agency CONR Continental U.S. NORAD Region CSG Counterterrorism Security Group CTC Counterterrorist Center DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DCI Director of Central Intelligence ESU Emergency Service Unit (NYPD) FAA Federal Aviation Administration FBI Federal Bureau … Continue reading →

HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT

13 HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT As presently configured, the national security institutions of the U.S. government are still the institutions constructed to win the Cold War. The United States confronts a very different world today. Instead of facing a few very dangerous adversaries, the United States confronts a … Continue reading →

WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY

12 WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY   12.1 REFLECTING ON A GENERATIONAL CHALLENGE Three years after 9/11, Americans are still thinking and talking about how to protect our nation in this new era. The national debate continues. Countering terrorism has become, beyond any doubt, the top national security priority for the United States. This … Continue reading →

FORESIGHT-AND HINDSIGHT

11 FORESIGHT-AND HINDSIGHT In composing this narrative, we have tried to remember that we write with the benefit and the handicap of hindsight. Hindsight can sometimes see the past clearly-with 20/20 vision. But the path of what happened is so brightly lit that it places everything else more deeply into shadow. Commenting on Pearl Harbor, … Continue reading →

WARTIME

10 WARTIME After the attacks had occurred, while crisis managers were still sorting out a number of unnerving false alarms, Air Force One flew to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. One of these alarms was of a reported threat against Air Force One itself, a threat eventually run down to a misunderstood communication in … Continue reading →

HEROISM AND HORROR

9   HEROISM AND HORROR   9.1 PREPAREDNESS AS OF SEPTEMBER 11 Emergency response is a product of preparedness. On the morning of September 11, 2001, the last best hope for the community of people working in or visiting the World Trade Center rested not with national policymakers but with private firms and local public … Continue reading →

“THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED”

8 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED”   8.1 THE SUMMER OF THREAT As 2001 began, counterterrorism officials were receiving frequent but fragmentary reports about threats. Indeed, there appeared to be possible threats almost everywhere the United States had interests-including at home. To understand how the escalation in threat reporting was handled in the summer of … Continue reading →

THE ATTACK LOOMS

7 THE ATTACK LOOMS   7.1 FIRST ARRIVALS IN CALIFORNIA In chapter 5 we described the Southeast Asia travels of Nawaf al Hazmi, Khalid al Mihdhar, and others in January 2000 on the first part of the “planes operation.” In that chapter we also described how Mihdhar was spotted in Kuala Lumpur early in January … Continue reading →

FROM THREAT TO THREAT

6 FROM THREAT TO THREAT In chapters 3 and 4 we described how the U.S. government adjusted its existing agencies and capacities to address the emerging threat from Usama Bin Ladin and his associates. After the August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Bill Clinton and his chief aides explored … Continue reading →